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MICHIGAN

LAW REVIEW
VOL. IX.

JANUARY,

x911

No. 3

LIABILITY OF MASTER FOR WILFUL OR MALICIOUS
ACTS OF SERVANT.
II.
§ 23. MASTM's LIAmITY FOR MALIIcous AcTs IN OTHER CASES.

-Retuming now to the general question of the master's liability for
malicious acts in cases not affected by any such special considerations as those which have.just been considereaciit may be premised,
as has been already stated, that the tendency of the modem cases
;s undeniably to attach less importance to the nrotive with which the
act was done and to give more attention to the question whether or
not it can be deemed to fall within the scope of the servant's employment.
§ 24. SAME SUBJECT-ILLUSTRATIONS.-The scope of the rulings

upon this subject can be best illustrated by some selections from the
adjudicated cases. Thus in a leading case in New York,4 in which
the older and more rigid rule was adhered to, it appeared that a son
while driving his father's horses and wagon about his father's business, seeing some boys attempting to get into the wagon, whipped
up his horses and the wagon ran over one of the boys who was seen
to be between the wheels when the horses were started. An action
was brought against the father and the son jointly to recover damafges, and a verdict rendered against them both. But CowEN, J.,
said: "It is impossible to sustain this verdict against t.! father.
It is difficult to infer from the evidence, anything short of a design
in Stephen (the son) to throw the plaintiff's boy from the wagon;
and the judge, as I understand the charge, told the jury that the
defendants were jointly liable in that view. If Stephen, in whipping the horses, acted with the wilful intention to throw the plaintiff's boy off, it was a plain trespass, and nothing but a trespass, for
"Wright

v. Wilcox, x9 Wend. (N. Y.) 343, 32 Am.Dec. 507.
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which the master of Stephen is no more liable than if his servant
had committed any other assault and battery. All the cases agree
that a master is not liable for the wilful mischief of his servant;
though he be at the time, in other respects, engaged in the service
of the former.45 Why is the master chargeable for the act of his
servant? Because what a man does by another he does by himself.
The act is within the scope of the agency. 'A master is not answerable,' says Mr. Hammond, 'for every act of his servant's life, but
only for those done in his relative capacity. To charge the master,
it must always be shown or presumed, that the relation of master
and servant subsisted between them in the particular affair. If the
master is liable under other circumstances, he is so, not quatenus
master, but as any one would be who instigatfs an injury.' The di-"
viding line is the wilfulness of the act. If the servant make a care-

less mistake of commission or omission, the law holds it to be the
master's business negligently done. It is of the very nature of business that it may be well or ill done. We frequently speak of a cau-

tious or careless driver in another's employment. Either may be in
the pursuit of his master's business, and negligence in servants is
so common, that the law will hold the master to the consequencesas
a thing that he is bound to foresee and provide against. But it is
different with a wilful act of mischief. To subject the master in
such a case, it must be proved that he actually assented, for the law
will not imply assent. In the particular affair, there is, then, no
longer the presumed relation of master and servant. The distinction seems to resolve itself into a question of evidence."
§ 25.
. The rule here announced by Judge Cow=. is undoubtedly that laid down by the older cases.' e But the better *and
more modern rule dearly is that the mere nature of the act is not
the only criterion, but that the most important test is whether the
act was dine in the course of the employment. Thus RYAN, C. J.,
says: "We cannot help thinking that there has been some useless
subtlety in the books in the application of the rule respondeat super0 Citing x Chit. PL 69; McManus v. Crickett, x East zo6; Hammond an Parties 83;
Croft v; Alison 4 Darm. & Aid, $go; x Chit. Gen. Pr. 8o; Bowcher v. Noidstrom, x Tau*m.
'568.
*,3cMaanus . Crickett, r 74st, xo6;'lit v. Turner, 8 T. X. 531; Niddlcton v.
Powler, z Salk. sSa; Croft Y. Alsawi, 4 3. & Aid. 59o; Bowcher v., Noidstrom, z "aunt.
568. Se6 also Tufler v. Voght, 13 IL,s78; Brown v. Purviance, a H. & G. (Md.) 316;
Foster v. Sez Bank 17 Ma,. 479. 9 Am. Dec. x68; Church v. Mansfield, jo Conn.
z84; Thames Steamboat Co. T. Hopsatont R. Co., 24 Cotm 4o, 63 Am. Dec. :54; Bard
v. Yohn. 26 Penn. St. 482; 1aW v. Lord, 30 X. Y. 38:, too -Am. Dec. 448; State -v.
Moi'is, &c. Ry. PO., 3 Z2b. (N..T.) 360; Misois Cent. EL R. Co. v. Downey, x8 III
ag; Xtvanae, &c., Ry. Co.- . Baum, 26 Ind. 7o; New Orleans, &c., Ry. Co. v. HarChou, 48 MW 212,12a Am. ReV. 306; Weaaon Y. Seaboard, &r-, IL. Co., 49 N. C. 3M
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ior, and some unnecessary confusion in the liability of principals for
wilful and malicious acts of agents. This has probably arisen from
too broad an application of the dictum of Lord HoLT, that no master
is chargeable with the acts of his servant but when he acts in the
execution of the authority given to him, and the act of the servant
is the act of the master.'47 For this would seein to go to excuse
the master for the negligence as well as fot the malice of his servant. One employing another in good faith to do his lawful work
would be as little likely to authorize negligence as nialice; and eithei
would be equally dehors the employment. Strictly, the act of the
servant would not, in either case, be -the act of the master. It is
'true that so great an authority as Lord KrNYoN denies this, in the
leading case of McManus v. Crickett,48 which has been so extensively followed; and again, in W&li v. Turner,4 9 distinguishes between
the negligence and the wilfulness of the one act of the agent, holding
the principal for the negligence but not for the wilfulness. It is a
singular comment on these subtleties, that McManus v. CrickeHt appears to rest on Middleton v. Fowler, the only adjudged case cited
to support it; and that Middleton v. Fouqer was not a case of
malice, but of negligence, Lord Hor holding the master in that
case not liable for the negligence of his servant, in such ciicumstances as no court could now doubt the master's liability. In spite
of all the learned subtleties of so many cases, the true distinction
ought to rest, it appears to us, on the condition whether or not the
act of the servant be in the course of his employment." 50
§ 26. -.
In accordance with the rule laid down in the case
last above referred to, it has been held in a great variety of cases
of more recent origin, that the master is liable for the wanton -or
malicious acts of his servant if they were committed while the servant was acting in the execution of his -authority and within the
scope of his employment.51 When this has been said, however, the'
Middleton v. Powler, i Sak a8z.
Sz East:zo6, supra.
468 Term Rep. s3z
0 Craker v. &
& NOtthwesterm Ry. Co., 36 iS. 6S7, 17 Am. RP. 504.. So
also Redding v. South Carolina R. L Co., 3 S. C. x, z6 Am Rep. 68r.
ASt. Louis, etc., Ry. Co. v. Hackett, 59 AxL 38, 24 S. W. 88, 4 Ab. St. ReP. 1Os.
Baltimore Consol. RY. Co. Y. Piesv&_ 89 Md. 49S, 43 AtL 94o; Aiken T. Hoyoke St. RT.
Co..'84 Mass *6. 68 N. Z. a38; Chicago, etc., Ry. Co. v. Kerr, 74 Neb. , 1N. W.
49; Mott v. Connnmvs Ye Co., y3 N. Y. $43; Magar v. Hammond, t8s N. Y. 387, 7
N. Z 474, 3 L. I. A. :xo8; jackson v. Telegraph Co., T39 N. C. 47, S S. F. 1o$,.P
I- R. A. 738; St-a,"hn Co. v. Cot. SS Ohio St. 398; 4S N. E. 634,,4 U. R. A. (N. S,)
So6; Nelson Busi s College Co. v. Lloyd, 60 Ohio St. 448. 54 N. Z. 47., 71 A=. St
Rep. 79, 46 L R. A. 314; Ploofr. Putnam, - Vt. - 7s Ail. a7; Western Un. Tel. C.
v. Cattell, zoo C..C. A. 489, 177 Fed. 7r.
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is by no means solved, for the difficult question always reproblem
mains as to what acts may be deemed to be within the scope of his
employment within the meaning of this rule. As in the case already
considered of the master's liability for the negligent acts of his servant, it is impossible to lay down any hard and fast rule by which
this question can be determined. In many cases no better definition
can be given than the words themselves suggest. But in general
terms it may be said that an act is within the scope of the employment if it be done while the servant was engaged upon the master's
business and if the act was done, however mistakenly, or ill-advisedly, with a view to further the master's interests, or if it arose from
some sudden impulse or emotion which grew out of or was incident
to the attempt to perform the master's business, and did not arise
wholly from some external, independent and personal motive on the
part of the servant to do the act upon his own account.
. In dealing with this question of motive, the time
§ 27.
and circumstances of its origin may often be significant. Thus if
the alleged wilfulness or malice arose out of the aggravations, annoyances or conflicts of the attempted performance of the master's
service, it is vastly easier to see that the act resulting from it was
still an act within the scope of the employment, than it is where the
motive arose at a time when the servant was not engaged in the
employment, and did not owe its origin to any attempt at performance, but was the personal and private malice or ill-will of the servant which the exigencies of the service did not create but merely
furnished an opportunity for its expression or satisfaction.
. It does not by any means follow, from this rule,
§ 28.
that the master is liable for any wilful or malicious act of his servant, even though it be committed during the time in which the servant is generally engaged upon the execution of his employment.
It, is not merely a question of time but is a matter of incident and
relation. The act must be done not only while the servant is acting
withii the exercise of his authority, but it must also'be within the
scope of the employment as already explained. At the same time,
it is not to be inferred that the master's liability depends upon
whether he has or has not intentionally authorized the doing of the
wrongful act. If he has done so, he is of course liable. The question is rather, as has been explained, whether the act was an incident
to, an outgrowth of, an ingredient in, the execution of the service
which the master confided to the servant. If that be the character
of the act, the master is liable though the act were done wilfully or
maliciously. If, on the other hand, the servant stepped aside from
his employment to do some act having no connection with his mas-

HeinOnline -- 9 Mich. L. Rev. 184 1910-1911

LIABILITY FOR MALICIOUS ACTS OF SERVANT

by his own private malter's business, and to which he was.inspired
52
ice or ill-will, the master is not liable.
An excellent illustration of the principles here in§ 29. -.
by the English case of Limpus v. London Genfurnished
volved is
5
eral Omnibus Company, wherein the question was very carefully
considered and in which there was some difference of opinion. The
facts as stated by one of the judges who held the defendants not
liable, and whose statement presents the facts in the strongest light
against the plaintiff, were as follows: "It appears by the evidence
in this case that the defendants were the proprietors of an omnibus
plying between the Bank and Hounslow, which at the time in question was driven by a coachman in their service; that whilst upon the
road, in the course of his employment to drive defendants' omnibus from Piccadilly to Kensington, he wilfully and on purpose, and
contrary to the express orders of the defendants, wrongfully endeavored to hinder and obstruct the passage along the road of another omnibus belonging to the plaintiff; and for that purpose, he,
who was ahead of the plaintiff's omnibus 8o or Ioo yards, slackened
his pace, until the plaintiff's omnibus came up to him and was about
to pass, and he then purposely pulled across the road in order to
prevent and obstruct his progress, and in so doing ran against one
5Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Routt, 25 Ky. L. Rep. 887.
In Greb v. Pennsylvania Ry. CO., 41 Pa. Super. Ct. 6x, a passenger after he bad gotten
off the train on which he had been a passenger and stepped onto the platform, was assaulted, without provocation, by the conductor of the train. Held: That an instruction that
defendant was liable was erroneous. Also that there was no liability under the general
duty to protect.
In Collins v. Butler. 83 App. Div. (N. Y.) 12, 81 N. Y. Supp. xo74, a clerk in a
store became unreasonably enraged at a woman customer who was seeking to buy some
apples that had been placarded in the storewindows, swore at her, threatened to "kick
her out" of the store, and did violently push and thrust her into the street. It was held
that the employer was liable, as a matter of law, for the act of the clerk.
u z H. & C. S26. In-the course of his opinion in this case, Willes, 7., said:
"But there is another construction to be put upon the act of the servant in driving
across the other omnibus;.he wanted to get before it. That was an act done in the course
of his employment. He was employed not only to drive the omnibus, which alone would
not support this summing up, but also to get as much money as he could for his master,
and to do it in rivalry with other omnibuses on the road. The act of driving as he did is
not consistent with his employment, when explained by his desire to get before the other
omnibus. I do not speak without authority when I treat that as the proper test. Take
the ordinary case of a master of a vessel, who it must be assumed is instructed not to do
what is unlawful but what is lawful, If he has distinct instructions not to sell a cargo under
any circumstances, but he does so under circumstances consistent with his duty to ia
master, the master is liable in damages to the person whose goods are sold."
See also Curley v. Electric Vehicle Co., 68 App. Div. 18, 74 N. Y. Supp. 35, where the
plaintiff's cab-driver moved into a line drawn up at a cab-stand ahead of his regular
"turn." The defendant's driver, who probably was entitled to the desirable location preempted by the plaintiff's driver, after asking plaintiff's driver to yield the position, cut
in ahead of plaintiff's cab with an electric cab and backed into plaintiff's horse and
injured him. The dWendant company was held liable for the injury.

HeinOnline -- 9 Mich. L. Rev. 185 1910-1911

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

of the plaintiff's horses with his (the defendants') omnibus, thereby
causing considerable damage. The reason assigned by the defendants' coachman for this wrongful proceeding was that he pulled
across the plaintiff's coachman to keep him from passing, in order to
serve him (the plaintiff's coachman) as he had served him (the
defendants' coachman)."
§ 30.
. A verdict for the plaintiff having been rendered,
judgment was affirmed by a majority of the judges in the Exchequer
Chamber, one judge dissenting. The position of the majority is
shown by the following extract from the opinion of BLACKBURN, J.:
"The defendants' servant was the driver of an omnibus, and as such
it Was his duty, not only to conduct it from one terminus to another,
but to use it for the purpose of picking up traffic during the course
of the journey. He drove across another omnibus under circumstances from which the jury might have thought that it was done
for the purpose of wreakir.g his spite against the driver of that omnibus. The learned-judge, having to tell the jury what was the test
by which they were to determine whether the act was done in the
course of the service or not, used language in which, he tells them,
perfectly rightly, that if the act was done in the course of the service the defendants were responsible; and he goes on to say, 'that
if the jury believed that the real truth of the matter was that the
defendants' driver, being dissatisfied and irritated with the plaintiff's driver, whether justly-or unjustly, by reason of what had occurred, and inthat state of mind acted recklessly, wantonly, and improperly, but in tie course of his service and employment, and in
doing thatwhich he believed to be for the interest of the defendants,
t6en the defendants were responsible for the act of 'their servant.
No doubt what Mr. MELLISH said is correct: it is not universally,
true that every act done for the interest of the master is done in the
course of the employment.. A footman might think it for the interest of his master to drive the coach, but no.one could say that it was
within the scope of the footman's employment, and that the master
would be liable for damages resqlting from the wilful act 'of the
footman in taking charge of the horses. But, in this case, I think
the direction given to the jury was a-sufficient guide to enable them
to say.whether the .particular act was done in the course of the employment."
§ 31.
. Many other illustrations of these principles are furnished by recent cases. Thus where the master was the proprietor
of a business college and had in his employment a servant whose
duty it was to clean the rooms at the close of the day, and this involved the moving of the tables for that purpose, it appeared that

HeinOnline -- 9 Mich. L. Rev. 186 1910-1911

LIABILITY FOR MALICIOUS ACTS OF SERVANT

on a certain day the plaintiff had been called in to repair -an electric
light in one of the rooms. In order to reach the light he had placed
a ladder upon one of the tables in the room. It was-at the close
of the day and the janitor was engaged in cleaning the room. This
involved the moving of the table on which the ladder stood. He
sought to move the table in order to go on with his work. The
plaintiff remonstrated and urged thatthe table be left as a -support
to the ladder until the plaintiff had completed the repairs.. An altir-4
cation followed and the janitor, becoming impatient, went on-with
his work of cleaning, pushed the table aside and thereby threw the
plaintiff to the floor, causing the injuries for which he sought damages from the master. The defendant contended "that the janitor
by reason of his ill-will toward the plaintiff, was actuated wholly
by malice, and vi6lently. shoved the table, -not in the performance of
any duty within his employment, but with the wilful purpose oilly
of injuring the plaintiff." The court, however, held that it was a
fair inference from. the evidence that the moving c the table, under
the circumstances was an act within the scope of the employment,
and that it was error for the trial court to direct a verdict for the
defendant.54
§ 32.
. In another case in the same court, it appeared that
the defendant was under contract to supply sand deliver milk to the

plaintiff's creamery; that the defendant had in his emploment a
servant who assisted in preparing the milk and delivering it to the
plaintiff, and that this servant, as was contended, maliciously and to
gratify ill-will which he had toward the defendant (although the de-

fendant was ignorant of it) fouled and adulterated the milk whi!h
he delivered to the plaintiff, thereby causing plaintiff the injury for
which recovery was sought. The trial court instructed the jury that
if this was the case, the defendant was not liable. A verdict and
judgment for the defendant under this instruction was reversed by

the Supreme Court upon several grounds, one of which, pertinent
-here, was that the jury might fairly find that the servant's act in
adulteratink the milk, which it was his duty to prepare and deliver,
was an act within the scope of his employment.5 5 It will be observed

that in this case, contrary to the usual facts, the alleged malice of
the servant existed against his employer and not against the plaintiff.
§ 33.
. In another case it appeared that the defendant, a
telegraph company, had a squad of men at work erecting wires un-

der the charge of the company's servant. It was desired to erect
"Nelson Business College Co. v. Lloyd. 6o Ohio St. 448, S4 N. It. 471, 7z Am. St.
Rep. 729, 46, L. R. A. 34.

"Stranahan Co. v. Coit, SSOhio St." 398, 45 W.

.

634, 4 L. LR. A., (N. S.) 5o6.
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the wires across the plaintiff's land. The plaintiff objected and offered forcible resistance. In order to get the plaintiff out of the
way, the servant in charge of the work lodged a complaint against
the plaintiff before a local magistrate and caused him to be arrested
and taken from the scene of action. While he was thus absent, the
work was hastily completed. Upon the hearing of the complaint,
the magistrate found that it was "frivolous and malicious" and discharged the plaintiff. The plaintiff sued the telegraph company for
false imprisonment and malicious prosecution. It was held to be a
question for the jury whether the servant, in causing the plaintiff's
arrest, was performing his master's business or was engaged in some
pursuit of his own. The jury found that the defendant's servant
"caused the plaintiff to be unlawfully arrested for the purpose of
putting him out of the way so that its agents and servants might
erect telephone and telegraph poles on his land." The court said:
"If this is not an act done in the course of the employment ind in
furtherance of the master's business, for his benefit and advantage,
be hard to conceive of one which would come under that
it would
56
class."
Many other cases in which the master was held liable are cited in
the notes.5 7
. Even under the most extreme statement of the
§ 34.
modem rule, however, there are many cases in which the master
will not be liable. As has been already stated, it is not enough that
the act be done while the servant was generally acting in the execution of his authority but the act complained of must be an act within
the scope of the employment. As was pointed out in a preceding
section, this is not merely a question of time but of incident and relation. As is stated in a recent case it seems sometimes to be assumed
"that an act done by a servant while engaged in the master's work
is necessarily an act done within the scope of the former's employ"Jackson v. Telegraph Co.. 139 N. C. 347. 51 S. - 1015, 70 L. R. A. 738.
T St. Louis. etc.. Ry. Co. v. Hackett. 58 Ark. 381, 24 S. W. 88x 4t Am. St. Rep. zo$
(night-watchman of railroad wantonly shooting an unresisting and harmless trespasser);
Chicago, etc., Ry. Co. v. Kerr 74 Neb. 1, X04 N. W. 49, (where a conductor threw a boy,
who was stealing a ride. under the train, after the boy had left the train in obedience to
the conductor's command); Mott v. Consumers' Ice Co., 73 N. Y. 543, (driver of icewagon purposely drove into plaintiff; court held fact it was a wilful act did not exclude all'
presumption of liability; it was still a question for the jury whether he was executing his
authority); Magar v. Hammond, 183 N. Y. 387, 76 N. F 474, 3 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1038,
(a poacher was shot by a watchman ,of a game preserve; the court held the master would
be liable for a wilful, wanton or reckless injury, only if it was committed in the general
scope of the watchman's employment); Aiken v. Holyoke St. Ry. Co., 184 Mass. 269, 68
N. E. 338 (a motorman wantonly started his car and injured the plaintiff, a six year old
boy, who was trying to get a secure position on the front step and who was calling to
the motorman to stop).
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ffnent. But this is conspicuously a, non sequituir. An-act done by the
servant while engaged in the work of his master may be entirely disconnected therefrom, done, not as a means or for the puipose of
performing that work, but solely for the accomplishment of the in
dependent, malicious, or mischevious purpose of the servant. Such
an act is not, as a matter of fact, the act of the master in any sense
and should not be deemed to be so as a matter of law. As.to it, the
* relation of master and servant does not exist between the parties,
and for the injury resulting to a third person from it the servant
alone should be held responsible."' 8
§ 35.
a . In.the case from which.this quotation was made it
appeared that the d~fendant's minor'son was engaged in sprinkling
his father's lawn under such circumstances as to Warrant the inference that in so doing he was acting as the father's servant. Whileso doing he 'turned. the hose off the lawn and apparently in a spirit
of mischief, threw water upon a horse, standing on the opposite side
of the street, causing the h6rse to run away and bringing about the
injury for which a recovery Was sought against the father. The trial
judge instructed the -jury that if they should find that the boy was
in the. father's 'service, anid either negligently or "from a mischievous
disposition" threw the water upon the horse and thereby caused the
injury, the father would be responsible. The court of errors, and
appeals unanimously held that this instruction was erroneous and
reversed a judgment which had been rendered for the plaintiff. The
court. said: "If the act of the defendant's son in throwing water
upon the plaintiff's horse was not the result of his careless handling
of the garden hose while sprinkling his father's lawn, but was deliberately done by him purely out of a spirit of mischief, for the
purpose of frightening the animal, the fact that he used the tool
supplied to him for the doing of his father's work for the accomplishment of his own mischievous pq*rose did not make it an act
within the scope of his employment and did not render the defendant liable for-the injury resulting therefrom."59 1
§ 36.
. In a recent case in Pennsylvania where damages
were sought against the master for the act of his servant, a teamster,
-who had with his whip struck a boy who had climbed up on the side
of the makterts wagon while the servant was driving it upon the
master's business, and had thereby caused the boy to fall beneath the
m Evers v. Krouse, 70 N. J. L. 6S3, 58 Atl. i8r, 66 L. R. A. 592. That there is a
marked distinction between the liability of the master for acts done during the employmet and those done within the scope of the employment, see Bowen v. Illinois Cent.
R. Co., 69 C. C. A. 444, 136 Fed. 3o6. Compare Hachl v. Wabash Ry. Co., z9 Mo. 325,
24 S. W.

737.

Evers v. Krouse, supra.
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wheels, the court said it was a question for the jury to determine
whether the driver did the act for the purpose of ejecting a trespasser from his master's wagon-a resilt which it would be both
his right and his duty to accomplish and for -accomplishing which,
either negligently or with excessive force the master would be respozdsible,--or whether he struck the boy to gratify some, personal
feeling of his own, in which event the master would not be liable.
In the language of the court: "If his act in striking the boy was
intended to remove him by force from the wagon, it would be the
act of his einployhr for which the latter would be responsible. If,
on the other hand, the purpose of the driver was not to cause the
b y to leave the wagon, but to inflict punishment upon him to gratify
the ill-will of the driver, the defendant company is not responsible
for the wrongful or tortious act. It would not be an act done by
the employee in the execution of his employer's business, although
it was performed while he was in the service of the employer. It
would be an act of the employee directed against the boy -independently of the driver's contract of service, and in no way connected
with, or necessary for, the accomplishment of the purpose for which
the driver was aployed."8O
§ 37.
. In another case the master, a railroad company,
was sought to be held liable .or the alleged act of. the conductor and
other train-men in forcibly puttifig a man upbn the train against his
will and. carrying him away. The act, if done at all, was done while
the servants were acting-generally in the execution of their authority. But it was held that the act, if done, would not be an act within the scope of the employment. "If a conductor," said the court,
"knowingly and wilfully participates in the act of taking and- transporting upon the cars, against his will, one whom Ire had no right
to receive on the cars for transportation, he and not the company,
would be liable for his conduct. The master is not liable for the
criminal acts of his servant, not authorized or sanctioned by him
nor'for his acts of wilful and malicious trespass'.'. 61
Other similar cases are cited in the note. 2
§ 38.
uST.-The

. FALst IliPRISONMWT AND

tJNAUTHORizzD

AR-

liability of the master for false imprisonment or unau-

PErennan v. 'Merchant & Co., aoS Pa. St. 258, 54 AtL 89:.

In a later case, almost identical in its facts, the court held the master -liable on the
ground: Hyman v. Tilton, 208 Pa. 641, 57 AtL xzz4.
m jackson v. St. Louls, etc., Ry. C., 87 Mo. 422, 56 Am. Rep. 46o.
*'Thus in Lynch v. -lorida, etc., Rr. Co., z1 Ga. 220S, 39 S. 4x, the railroad coinvany was held not responsible for a personal assault made by its station agent during a
personal encounter between the plaintiff and a station agent which grew out of the proYoling conduct of *heoplaintiff even though the original ground of controversy ardse out of
matters connected with the railroad company's business.
frt
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thorized arrest must also depend upon the circumstances of each
case. A person may be employed as, for example, a detective, for
the express purpose of bringing about an arrest or imprisonment.Even though authority to arrest was not expressly given it may anrie
by implication, as an incident of some other employment. Thus.
watchmen, private policemen or private detectives are not infrequently employ& by railroad and steamboat companies, theaters and
department store companies and the like, for the purpose of protecting property, preventing crime and apprehending offenders.". It is
not uncommon, in such cases, for the persons so appointed to be also
commissioned by the state or the municipality as public policemen
or detectives." Power to arrest and imprison in such cases may
"Pennsylvania Co. v. Wedle, zoo Imd. Z38, Evansville, etc., R. Co. v. McKee, 99
Ind. Si9, So Am. Rep. zo2; American Express Co. v. Patterson, 73 Ind. 43o; Duggan v.
Baltimore, etc., . CO., xS9 Pa. 248. 28 AtL 282, 39 Am. St. Rep. 672; Kastue v. Long
Island R. CO., 76 App. Div. 323, 78 N. Y. Sapp. 469.
"A private railroad detective was authorized to make srensa only on eonmatation with
attorneys, unless the proof was clear and the necessity urgent. Without consulting any
one he caused the arrest of plaintiff for passing counterfeit money. The charge being
groundless, it was held that the defendant company was liable for the false arrest:
Eichengreen v. Louisville, etc., R.'Co., 96 Tenn. 229, 34 S, W. aig, S4 Am. St. Rep. 833,
3 L. R. A. 702.
.
n It is often difficult in these cases to determine whether what was done was done as
servant of the master or as public officer for the public good. The mere fact that the
servant was also a public officer will not relieve the master from liability. Nor d6ea the
fact that the public officer was also a servant impose such liability. It seems to be a
question of fact in each case. If what was done was done as servant and for the protection of the master's property the master would be liable. See Baltimore, etc., Ry. Co. Y.
Ennalls. 1o8 Md. 7s. 69 Atl. 638, z6 L. R. A. (N. S.) rzoo; Toichester Beach Imp. Co.
v. Steinmeier, 72 Md. 313, 2o AtL z88, 8 L.. R. A. 846; Deck v. Baltimore, etc., Ry. Co.,
zoo Md. z68. S9 At]. 6So, zoB Am. St. Rep. 399; Baltimore, etc., R. Co. v. Deck, o2 Md.
669. 62 AtL'9S8; Baltimore, etc., R. Co. v. Twilley, xo6 Md. 445, 67 At]. 265; Tolchester
Beach Imp. Co.'v. Scharnagl. xos Md. z9g, 6S AtL 9x6; Clark v. Starin; 47 Hun (N. Y.)
345; King Y. Ill. Cent. R. Co., 69 Miss. 245, io South. 42; Union Depot Co. v. Smith,
x6 Colo. 36r, 27 Pac. 329; Wells v. Washington Market Co., 8 Mackey (D. C.) 383;
Norfolk, etc., R. Co. v. Galliher, 89 Va. 639, x6 S. E. 933; Dickson v. Waldron, 235
Ind. 507, 34 N. E. So6, 3S N. E. 2, 4 Am. St. R..44o, 24 L. R. A. 483, 488; Tyson vw
Bauland Co., z86 N. Y. 307, 79 N. E. 3, 9 L. R. A. (N. S.) 267; Sharp v. Brie Ry. Co.
:84 N. *Y. 1oo 76 N. F. 923, 6 Am. & Eng. Ann. CaS. 250; Brill v. Eddy, :x5 Mo. 596,
22 S. W. 488; Healey v. Lothrop, 171 Mass. z63, 50 N. B. 540; Tucker v. Erie Ry. Co.,
69 N. J. Law 19, 34 At]. 357; Cordner v. Railway Co., 72 N. H. 413, 37 AtL 234; Foster
v. Grand Rapids Ry. Co., :4o Mich. 689, 104 N. W. 38o; Thomas v. Can. Pac. R. R. Co.,
14 Ont. I. Rep. SS, 8 Am. and 4ng. Ann. Ca& 324; McKain v. Baltimore & 0. R. Co.,
63 W. Va. 233, 64 S. B. z8.
In St- Louis, etc., Ry. Co. v. Hudson (Ark.), x30 S. W. 534, there was a statute
authorizing conductors on trains to act as peace officers in arresting drunken persons.
The Court instructed that if the conductor erred in thinking plaintiff drunk the company was liable. Held: Erroneous. The company is not liable if the conductor reasonably and bona fide believed plaintiff to be drunk. . In St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. Marrow, 88 Ark. 583, 113 S. W. 173, a town marshal was
furnished with a pass over appellant's railroad, in return for which the marshal was to
give particular protection to the railroad property. The marshal, in arresting a tramp who
was stealing a ride on the appellant's train shot and wounded him. The court thought it
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often be expressly given, but where it is not it may often be regarded
as a fair incident and the -employer will be liable for its wrongful
exercise. Ticket agents and gatemen of railroads, steamboats, theaters, and the like, may be expressly or by implication authorized to
arrest or detain persons attempting to pass without paying fare or
having the proper ticket;S "floorwalkers,"'managers of stores, and
others similarly situated may be found to be expressly or by implication, authorized to apprehend, detain or give into custody persons"
guilty of "shop-lifting" and other similar offenses.67. Conductors
doubtful whether there was evidence sufficient to establish the relation of master and servant; that there was evidence warranting a finding Jhat the marshal was acting in the
discharge of his public duty, and that the jury should have been instructed that if they
slhould so find, the appellant was not liable.
A ticket agent who follows a woman out upon the platform of an elevated railway
structure and there accuses her of passing counterfeit money, slanders her character, lays
'hands upon her and detains her for some time, is acting within the scope of his employment so as to render the company liable. Palmeri v. Manhattan R. Co., 133 N. Y.
261..4o N. E. soor, x6 L. R. A. 136.
The conductor of a passenger train refused to accept plaintiff's ticket and demanded
cash fare. Some difficulty ensued and the conductor caused the plaintiff to be arrested and
tiaken from the train at the next'town. The company was held liable for the false arrest.
Atchison, etc., R. Co. v. Henry, $5 Kan. 715, 41 Pac. 952, 29 *L. R .A. 465. See also
Palmer v. Maine Central R. Co., 92 Me. 399,'42 AtL 8oo, 44 L. R. A. 67j; Lynch v.
Metropolitan El. R. Co., 9o N. Y. 77, 43 Am. Rep. x1 ; Krulevitz v. Eastern P_ Co., 143
Mass. 228. 9 X. B. 6z3; Ruth v. St. Louis Transit Co., 98 Mo. App. x, 78 S. W. xoss;
Dwyer v. St. Louis Transit Co., o8 Mo. Ap)p. x2, 83 S. W. 303.
In a cdse where the agent of .an express company instituted criminal proceedings
against consignees who had obtained a package without paying the charges, it was held
that if he did this as a means of collecting the money for his principal the latter was
liable: but not, if the purpose was simply to punish the offender: Cameron7 v. Pacific
Express Co., 48 Mo. App. 99.
But where a ticket agent directed the arrest of one who he thought had attempted to
rob the till, he was held to be acting without the scope of his authority: his authority being
limited to the protection of his principal's property, and as the attempt of plaintiff to
rob the till had been completed, and without success, his arrest was not an act of protection hut of punishment, for which the defendant was not lishle; Allen v. London, etc., R.
Co., L-R. 6 Q. B. 6s.
67Where a saleswoman mistakenly thought she saw a customer steal lace, and reported it immediately to the floorvalker, who arrested and searched her, the employer
was held liable. Knowles v. liullene & Co., 71 Mo. App. 341'
A clerk was temporarily left in charge of a small store. Erroneously thinking he
discovered a customer stealing silverware he detained her and sent for a police officer
who searched her. The court held the employer liable. Staples v. Schmid, x8 R. I. 224,
26 AtL. 593, 59 I, R. A. 824 (disapproving Mali v. Lord, 39 N. Y. 381; xoo Am. Dec. 448).
Mailach v. Ridley, 43 Hun (N. Y.) 336, follows Mali v. Lord, supra. In Gearity v.
* Strasbourger, 133 N. Y. App. Div. 7os, a7 saleswoman in a department store falsely
reported to the manager that the plaintiff had stolen goods. The manager took plaintiff
to one of the proprietors, called a police' officer and with the acquiescence of the pfoprletor caused plaintiffs arrst. Held, that both manager and proprietor were liable.
Where a floor-walker, 'for the purpose of extortion, arrested a woman and accused her
of theft when he knew she had not stolen anything, the employer is not liable. Cobb v.
Simon, i2 4 Wis. 467, xo2 N. W. 89r.
In Smith v. Munch, 65 Minn. 256, 68 N. W. xg, the plaintiR was a striker who created
some disturbance in and about the factory of the Bohn Mfg. Co., at the noon:hour on a
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and other similar agents on trains and boats, door-keepers at. theaters, and the like, have. often implied if not express authority to
arrest and give into custody persons misbehaving themselves upon
the employers' premises or vehicles.68 Many other similar cases
will at once suggest themselves.
In all these cases the master will be liable if the servant, while
acting within the scope of his master's business and not solely for
his own ends or purposes, makes an arrest or causes an imprisonment,
even though the servrnt acted upon insufficient evidence or wifh
mistaken zeal or even in direct disregard of the precautionary instructions which had been given him by the master."
. Where however no express autkxrity to arrest has
§ 39. been given and it cannot be regarded as a legitimate incident of any
power expressly given, the master will not be liable even though the
servant may have caused the arrest with the 'mistaken notion of
furthering the master's business 0 A fortiori will the master not
Late in the afternoon the defendant
day subsequent to the commencement of the strike.
Munch returned to the factory, and upon learning of the trouble at noon, directed a
policeman to arrest the plaintiff, which was done without a warrant. Munch was the
general superintendent of the company, and had charge of its premises, business, and
employees. The court held the company liable for the unlawful arrest, saying, by Mitchell,
J.: "This duty rof the general superintendency] impliedly included the protection of the
premise* and property from trespassers, and the protection of the employees, while at
work, from the interference of intruders. The act of Munch'in directing plaintiff's arrest
was evidently not done in his own -interest, or for his own benefit, but in the furtherance
of the interest of the company by protecting its property and employees from wrongdoers."
01In Giilingham v. Ohio River R. Co., 35 W. Vs. 588, 14 S. F. 243, the conductor of
the defendant had a controversy with an intoxicated passenger. He summoned a pollo6.
man to arrest the disturber, but by mistake be pointed out the wrong passenger, the plaintiff, who was in no way involved in the controversy and who was in no way miabehaving.
The court held the company liable for the false arrest, as the conductor was acting on
behalf of the company in diredting the arrest of the plaintiff.
For cases of unauthorized arrests growing ouP'of controversies over the payment of
fare, see: Ruth v. St. Louis Transit Co., 98 Mo. ApI. 1, 71 S. W. xoSS; Kelly v. Durhbam
Traction Co., 132 N. Car. 368, 43 S. E. 923.
Proprietor of theater liable for assault and arTest of patron by doorkeeper and ticketseller: Dickson v. Waldron, 135 Ind. 507, 34 N. E. 5o6.
OSee Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Wedle, zoo Ind. 138; Evansville, etc., R. Co. v. McKee, 99 Ind. 5ig, 5o Am. Rep. 1oa;'American Express Co. v. Patterson, 73 Ind. 430;
Gillingham v. Ohio. R. R. Co., 35 W. Va: 588, i4 S. E. 243; Smith v. Munch, 65 Minn.
256, 68 N. W. r9; Singer Mfg. Co. v. Rahn, 132 U. S. Sx8; Kastner v. Long Island R.
Co., 76 App. Div. 323, 78 N. Y. Supp. 469. And other cases cited in preceding notes.
"An agent who is in possession of a stock of goods as agent for a chattel mortgagee
in possession, hat no implied authority to prosecute for perjuring a party who makes an
attachment affidavit and attcheas the goods. Laird v. Farwell, 6o Kan. 51, 57 Pac, 98
An authority to arrest persons for violation of labor contracts is not incident to the
employment of clerks in a commissary store maintained by the construction company
whose contracts had been violated, although the authority of such clerks extended to~collecting amounts due from laborers to the company. Vara v. Quigley Const. Co., 514 La.
a2, 38 South. z62.
Where a master had directed a servant to exclude all persons from a certain building
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.be liable where the arrest or imprisonment is merely the result of

the servant's own personal malice or ill-will l or of his, generally commendable, deiire, as a citizen to bring offenders to justice.72 ,
who dil not have a ticket, such' direction does not authorize the servant to procure a
policeman to arrest a woman who tried to force her way in without a ticket, and the
master will not be liable for such arrest. Jarabasz v. Kabat, 86"Md. 23, 37 Atl 720.
It is no part of a *ticket agent's duty to endeavor to apprehend counterfeiters, and the
-ompany is not responsible for an unauthorized arrest *here the company's interests are
nsot concerned, as where the ticket agent deliberately takes a bill which he believes to be
counterfeit in order to aid the police in the detection of counterfeiters. Mulligan v. N.
Y., etc., Ry. Co., z29 N. Y. 5o6, 29 N. E. 952, 14 L. R. A. 791. See also Central Ry.
Co. v. Brewer, 78 Md. 394, 28 AtL. 615, 27 I. R. A. 63; Gulf, etc., R. Co. v. Donahoe, 56

Tex. x62.
In Little Rck Trac. & Blec. Co. v. Walker, 6S Ark. 144, 45 S. W. S7, 40 I. R. A.
473. a street car conductor called a policeman to take off and arrest a delinquent passenger. The company was held not liable as the conductor's authority -zias limited to removing passengers.
In Milton v. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co., 193 Mo. 46, 9%S. W. 949, 4 L. R. A. (N. S.) 282,
the defendant company employed a detective to ascertain the facts surrounding a train
robbery. The detective caused the arrest of the plaintiff. The court held the defendant
was not liable, as authority to ascertain facts dpes not imply authority to arrest persons
for the purpose of ascertaining whether or not *he person arrested was concerned in the
robbery; (substantially sinilar is Murrey v. Kelso, 5o Wash. 47, 38 Pac. 879).
In Lubliner v. Tiffany & Co., S4 App. Div. 326, 66 N. Y. Supp. 659, one Hyde was the
superintendent in charge of the general admiftistration of the defendant's jewelry house.
The defendant often offered rewards for jewelry lost by its customers, but another agent
had in charge all matters connected with such lost jewelry, and such other agent was
independent of, and not under the supervision of. the superintendent Hyde. One Pugh
applied to defendant for a reward the defendant had offered. Hyde went with Pugh to
the police magistrate's office and made an affidavit upon which a warrant for the arrest
of plaintiff was issued. The court held that the authority of Hyde did nbt extend to the
protection or recovery of property belonging to customers of the defendant, and that the
defendant was not liable for the false arrest of the plaintiff.
In Waters v. Anthony, 2o App. Cases (Dist. of Columbia) 124, the plaintiff was arrested on the charge of having stolen an express package from the office of the Adams
Ex1ress Company, where he was employed. The court found no substantial evidence from
which -to conclude that Waters, the clerk in charge of the Washington office, caused the
arrest of the plaintiff. But if he had done so, the court said there was "not a scintilla
of evidence" upon which the express company could be held liable. The authority of
such an agent did not contemplate such an act as the one sought here to be held to be
the act of the company.
In Hero v. Iowa State Agricultural Society, 91 Iowa 97, 58 N. W. 1092, 24 L. R. A.
65S, the plaintiff was unlawfully arrested by one of, the officers or agents of the defendant.
The court said that inasmuch as the defendant was a public body, with representatives
elected from the various counties; as it was not incorporated for pecuniary profit; as tha
state expressly gave its officers and agents power to arrest for two offences, and as the
offence with which the plaintiff was charged was neither of those two, that the officers
or agents arresting plaintiff were acting outside the scope of the powers the society could
aonfer upon them and the- defendant cannot be held therefor.
n Ii a "floor-walker" in a store knowingly makes a false charge of theft against a per,.on and by trick attempts to sustain it, for the purpose of extortion or other unlawful
personal purpose, the master is not liable; Cobb v. Simon, x24 Wis. 467, 102 N. W. 891;
219 Wis. 597, 97 N. W. 276.
"Arrests made or caused after the emergency is passed and merely for the purpose
of punishing the offender or bringing him to justice, are not ordinarily .within the scope
of the- employment of an agent whose duty it is to guard or protect property or to re-
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Closely allied to the questions just considered" and
§ 40. -.
with them, is the question of the master's
identical
cases
in many
liability for unjustified prosecutions. The power to institute prosecutions may be expressly conferred, or it may be found to be within
the scope of an.authority conferred for some other purpose. In
either event a prosecution undertaken for the purpose of furthering
the master's, business would, if unfounded, impose liability upon
the master. 73
Prosecutions, however, the institution of which has no legitimate
not be deemed to be
relation to the master's business or which can
7"
and those instituted
.authority;
agent's
within the scope of the
Markley v. Snow, 207 Pa. 447, s6 AtL 999, 64 L. R. A. 685;
cover it if taken.
Allen v. London, etc. Ry. Co.. L. R. 6 Q. B. 65; Travis v. Standard L & A. Ins. Co,
86 Mich. 288, 49 N. W. 140, (followed in Govaski v. Downey, xoo Mich. 429, s9 N. W.
App. ss6.
z67); Singer Mfg. Co. v. Hancock, 74 Ill.
In Decker v. Lackawanna, etc., R. CO., 39 Pa. Super. Ct. a2, the conductor of a train
telegraphed ahead to the train dispatcher that there was a crowd of disorderly persons on
his train. The dispatcher telegraphed back that there would be police officers at the
station when the train arrived, but that they were instructed not to arrest anyone for
When the train.arrived, a police officer asked the
what he had done upon the train.
conductor to point out the disorderly group and the conductor did so. Thereupon the
officer arrested the plaintiff who was one of them. Held, that the company was not
liable for this arrest.
Arrests caused by an agent to save himself from liability to master rather than to
further the master's interests, do-not make master liable" Lirson v. Fidelity Mut. 1.
Aa., 71 Minn. zo, 73 N. W. 711.
IS See Ruth v. St. Louis Transit C6., 98 Mo. App. 1, 71 S. W. soSS, (a case'where
the foreman of the transit company instituted a proceeding ag'ainst the plaintiff for a
the
disturbance of the peace, as the result of a ccntroversy over an unfounded claim that
plaintiff had not paid his fare); Dwyer v. St. Louis Transit Co., zo8 Mo. App. is..
83 S. W. 303, (a case of the same general nature). But see Central Ry. Co. v. Brewer,
Mo. App. 99,
78 Md. 394, 28 Atl. 6rs, 27 L. R. A. 63; Cameron v. Pacific Fpress Co., 48
(a more questionable case, where "the agent of an express company instituted crimihal
proceedings for the purpose of coercing payment of charges upon.a package sent C. 0. D.
which the consignees had obtained from. a boy in charge of the office without p-aying
the charges); Lyden v. McGee, x6 Ont. zo5; Wheeler & Wilson Mfg. Co. v. Boyce,
replevin
36 Kan. 350, z3 Pac. 609 (where the company, had directed an agent to.bring
i:
for a machine sold, which the agent did, and then as the constable could not find
caused the plaintiff, who was the buyer's husband, to be arrested, charged with secreting
the machine).
14
In the following cases the defendant was held not liable:" Govasky v. Downey,
zoo Mich. 429, 59 N. W. x67, (prosecutionfor the theft of a railroad company's property
act was
instituted by one called a detective but no evidence given showing that the
within the scope of his employment); Murrey v. Kelso, 1o Wash. 47, 38 Pac. 879, (where"
ageit employed to search for property which had been lost and to take all lega! steps for
v. Farwell,
its recovery, instituted a prosecution for the larceny of the property); Laird
60 Kan. 512, 57 Pac. 98, where an agent put in charge of goods instituted prosecution
for perjury against a person who had made an affidavit in attachment proceedings
Co.
wherein some of the goods in the agent's possession were seized); Springfield Rnginc
for forv. Green, 25 II1. App. zo6, (where the collection agent instituted prosecutions
a rebate on
gery against a debtor who, as he contended, had forged an agreement giving
the claim
the claim); Atchison, etc. Ry. Co. v. Brown, 57 Kau- 785, 48 Pac 32, (where
agent of. a railroad company instituted prosecution for the robbing of a post-office on the.
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merely to punish an offender or to bring a wrong-doer
to justice;75
and those instituted merely to accomplish -some
purpose of the
agent orly.;76 and those which owe their 6rigin
wholly to the personal ill-will or malice of the agent," impose
no' liability upon the
master.
§ 41..
MAxIcIous PRosxruTiox.-It has been seen in an
earlier section"s that there are inany cases. in whch
the principal may
be liable, as for an act within the scope of the
employment, where
his agent has instituted a prosecution against a
third person without
reasonable cause. Although these are called cases
of
ecution, the cause of action does not depend upon malicious prosthe existence of
express or actual malice. The question now in
hand concerns cases
where such express or actual malice is involved.
May the principal
be held liable for a prosecution instituted because
of the express and
actual malice of his agent? The -determination
of this. question
seemsto depend upon the same considerations
as those already referred to in connection with the general subject
of
tive. If though the agent had actual ill-will against malicious mothe person prosecuted, the prosecution of that person was an
act within the scope
of his employment, and was instituted .because
it was within the
scope of his employment, the principal would be
liable regardless of
the motive27 If, on the.other'hand,.though the
prosecution of some
other person might be within the scope of the employment,
the prosecution of this person was not, or if the prosecution
of
this
person
under some other -circumstances would be within
the course of his
employment, the prosecution of him under'these
circumstances was
.not, and the agent prosecuted this person, or this
person under these
theory, as it was contended, that he might
thereby discover who had robbed the railroad
company on another occasion); Staton v. Mason,
so6 App. Div. 26, 94 N. Y. Supp. 417,
(where a prosecution was instituted by one
called the "credit clerk" of the defendant, but
concerning the scope of whose duty-no evidence
at
75Markley v. Snow, 207 Pa. 447. S6 AtL 999, all appears).
64 L. R. A. 685; Singer Mfg. Co. v.
Hancock, 74.111. App. 556; Carter v. Howe
Machine Co., si Md. 290, 34 Am. Rep. 311;
Daniel v. Atlantic Coast L. R. Co., z36 N.
C. S17, 48 S. E. 816.
The master is ndt liable for arrests or prosecutions
by a servant "on his own responsibility only," even though his purpose was
to promote his master's interest, e. g., to
collect a debt due to the master. Emerson v.
Lowe Mfg. Co., 159 Ala, 35o, 49 So.. 69.
78 Larson v. Fidelity Mutual Life Assn.,
71 Minnr. ox, 73 N. W, 71!, (prosecution
instituted by an agent primarily to'coerce
paynent of a claim upon which the agent
was also liable).
In Kutner v. Fargo, 2o N. Y. Mise. 207, it
was held that the master is not chargeable
with the malice of his agent or servant in giving
testimony tipon a criminal proceeding.
TSee post 1 41.
"See ante § 38.
70See Ruth v. St. Louis Transit Co.,
98 Mo. App. ., 71 S. NV. lois; Stubbs -v.
Mulholland, 168 Mo. 47. 67 S. W. 6So; Dwyer
v. St. Louis Transit Co., to8 Mo. App. z52,
83 S. W. .303; Hussey v. Norfolk, etc. R.
R. Co., 98 N. C. 34, 3 S. E. 923, 2 Am. St.
Rep. 3x2.
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circumstances, 'merely to give exression to some actual malie of

his own, the principal would not be liable.8 In some casesthe time
at which the prosecution was instituted may be material.' The institution of proceedings at -the time of the transactionnmay sometimes
be deemed to be so closely incidental to the transaction, as to come
,within the scope of the authority to do it; while if the .prosecution
be delayed it can only be accounted for upon the ground that its
purpose was to punish or to get revenge or simply to perform a
public diuty by bringing the offender to justice.8 ' No one of these
purposes would ordinarily be within the scope of the authority, and
the second one, which is the only one here pertinent, would obviously not.be within its scope.
§ 42.
. AssAuLs.-The cases in which the master can
be held liable for assaults committed by his servant, upon the ground
that the assault. was committed within the scope of the employment,
are not very numerous. The cases in which the master owes a.
special duty of protection, as in the case of the carrier of passengers and others similarly situated, stand upon special ground, and
are separately cortsidered.8 2 They do not usually rest merely upon
the doctrine of respondeat superior. Where the master'confides to
the servant the performance of a duty which involves the exercise
of force and the servant is put in a position where he.must determine when the force is to be exercised, and to what degree, the master will be liable though the servant mistakes the occasion or uses
the force to an excessive degree.83 So, though the master may not
f See Larson v Fidelity Mutual Life Assn., 72 Minn. rox, 73 N. W. 71x; Carter v.
Howe Machine Co., Si Md. 29o; Wallace v. Finberg, 46 Tex. 35.
3See Allen v. London, etc. Ry. Co., I. R. 6 Q. B. 6S, (where the court refers to
"a marked distinction between an act done for the purpose'of protecting the property by
preventing a felony, or of recovering it back, or an act done for the purpose of punishing
the offender for that- which has already been done"); Caster v. Howe Machine Co..
S1 Md. 29o; Travis v. Standard L. & A. Ins. Co.. 86 Mich. 288, 49 N. W. 14o; Markley
v. Snow. 207 .Pa.447. 56 Atl. 999, 64 L. R. A. 685; Tolchester Beach Imp. Co. v.
Steinmeyer, 72 Md. 33, ao AtL s88; Gillett v. Missouri Valley R. Co., SS Mo. 3x5,
17 Am. Rep. 653; Daniel v. Atlantic Coast L. R. Co., x36 N. Car. 517, 48 S. R. 8x6,
"See § 4.
8 "If the master give an order to a servant which implies the use of force and violence
to others, leaving to the discretion of the servant to decide when the occasion arises to
which the order applies, and the extent and kind of force to be used, h.eis liable if the
servant in executing the order makes use of force in a manner or to a degree which is
unjustifiable." Howe v. Newmarch, 12 Allen (Mass.) 49.
This doctrine is constantly applied in a great variety of cases 'against railroad companies which -have authorized their servants to eject ot remove persons who do not pay
their fare or comply with other regulations of the company, or persons who trespass upon
the vehicles or premises of the company. These cases are almost too numerous to
rmention, but among them see: Golden v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co., 3§ Mont. .435, 104
Pac. 549; Chicago, etc., Ry. Co. v. Kerr, 74 Nebr. s, 104 N. W. 49; Central of Georgia
Ry. Co: v. Brown, 113 Ga. 414, 38 S. E. 989, 84 Am. St. Rep.4250; M. & 0. R. 1. Co.
v. Scales, xoo Ala. 368, 13 South. 917; Kansas City, etc., R. Co. v. 'Kelly, 36 Kan. 65S,
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have contemplated the exercise of force, still if he sends his servant
to perform an act which is immediately and directly likely to result
in the exercise of force by the servant, as where resistance to the
act is reasonably to be anticipated, the master will be liable if, in a
conflict which ensues, the servant is guilty of illegal or excessive
force."s Aside from cases of this nature, the instances must be rare
x72; Marion v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 64 Ia. 568, 2z N. W. 86; St. Louis, etc.,
R. Co. v. Pellt89 Ark. 87, £15 S. W. 957.
-Within the same principle-are cases similar to Barden v. Felch, £o9 Mass. S4. In that
case the defendant entered on land to which both he and the plaintiff claimed title. The
defendant took with him his servant and directed the servant to plough the land and
maintain possession by force. The servant injured the plaintiff in a conflict which ensued
over the possession. The court held, the defendant liable for the injury, even if the
servant used more for~e than the master authorized him to use.
See also Rogahn v. Moore Mfg. Co., 79 Wis. 573, 48 14. W. 669, where the foreman
of the defendant's works discharged an employee and seriously injured him while forcibly
ejecting him from the works. - The court held that the authority vested in the foreman
to discharge impliediy vested in him the power to eject a discharged employee. Having
that power the defendant is liable if his servant uses excessive force in the execution of it.
Also, Canfield v. C. R. I & P. Ry. Co., 59 Mo. App. 3S4, where the defendant had
employed a servant to prevent telegraph operators, who were on a strike, from persuading
the operators in the employ of the defendant frQm joining the strike, and such servant
had viciously assaulted plaintiff, one-of the striking operators, while plaintiff was in
the company's offices talking to the operator. The company was held liable for the
assault.
In Houston, etc. Ry. Co. v. Bell, 73 S. W. 56 (Tex. Civ. App.), the defendant company was held liable for an assault committed by a freight agent in an altercation which
grew out of rough handling of freight by plaintiff, where it appeared that the servant's
duties included the protecting of freight.
In Alton Ry. and Illuminating Co. v. Cox, 84 IIl. App. 2o2, a care-taker of a park
owned by defendant ordered plaintiff to leave the park. The plaintiff started out, and a
controversy arose as to the keeper's authority'to put him out of the grounds. In the controversy and physical combat which followed the keeper threw stones at the plaintiff and
struck him. The master was held liable. See also Johnson v. C., . I. & P. Ry. Co.,
58 Ia. 348, 12 N. W. 329.
In Lesch v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 93 Minn. 435. rot N. W. 965, a watchm-n
authorized to search for stolen property, brutally conducted a search and seriously frightened plaintiff. The defendant was held liable.
See also Griffith v. Friendly, 30 Misc. 393, 62 N. Y. Supp. 39£; Oakland City Agricultural Society v. Bingham, 4 Ind. App. 545, 31 N. E. 383.
AtL 698, x9 Am. St. Rep. 708, 8 L. R. A.
"In McClung v. D earborne, £34 Pa. 396,
504. the defendant sold organs under a plan whereby the defendant retained title, and the
right of possession rtvested if installments were not paid. A collector for defendant
obtained admission to the plaintiff's home through a fraudulent device, and discovered
an organ, on which the defendant had such a claim for unpaid installments, in the
possession of plaintiff, who had purchased the organ from the original buyer. The 'defendant instructed this collector to take possession of this organ if he could get it peaceably
and without assaulting anyone. The collector assaulted the plaintiff in his effort to get
possession of the organ. The court held the defendant liable.
For a case very sinilar in its facts, except that the master did not caution the servant
not to commit an assault, see Ferguson v. Roblin, 17 Ont. £67; also, O'Connell v. Samuel,
81 Hun (N. Y.) 357, 30 W. Y. Supp; 889; see also Dyer v. Munday, [x895] x Q. B. D.
742. Peddie v. Gaily, zo9 App. Div. £78, 95 N. Y. Supp. 652, is put on the same ground,
although the inference of authority does not seem to the present writer so obvious as it
did to the court.

14 Pac.
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in which the exercise of personal vio'.nce can be regarded as within the scope of the employment.
. The servant's act in punishing persons who annoy
-§ 43. him in the performance of the service, or who interfere with or injure the master's property, or his act in using personal violence asa means of coercing the performance of contracts or the payment
,ofdebts due the master, can very seldom be regarded as within the
scope of the employment. 5 A fortiori will this be true where the
UIn the following cases the master was held not liable: Dolan v. Hubinger, ro9
Iowa 408, 8o . W. 54 (where- a motorman threw a stone at boys who had placed
obstructions on the'track and struck the plaintiff, one of the. boys); Rudgeair Y.
Reading 'Traction Co., :8o Pa. St. 333, 36 AtL 859 (where a motorman left a car and
struck the driver of a team which was on the track ahead of him); Lynch v. Florida, etc.,
Ry. Co., 113 Ga. :xo5, 39 S. F- 411, 54 L,. R. A. 8:o (where a station agent and his father
struck and injured -laintiff in an -altercation arising from a personal quarrel, which
quarrel had its inception in a dispute over a business transaction of the plaintiff with the
defendant railroad); Georgia Railroad & Banking Co. v. Wood, 94 Ga. a4, a1 S. . 88,
47 Am. St. Rep. 146 (where a brakeman threw a stone at a boy who had been jumping
on the train, and struck the plaintiff, a by-stander); Gullle v. Campbell, zoo Pa. 1:g,
49 AtL 938 (where a servant of defendant who- was engaged in handling bales of cotton,
waved an iron hook, furnished by defendant to facilitate the handling of the cotton, to
frighten boys who were playing on the bales; the hook slipped from his hand and struck
plaintiff); Williams v. Pullman Car Co., 4o La. Ann. 87, 3 So. 63:, 8 Am. St. Rep. 513
(where a portet of defendant violently assaulted the plaintiaE Who had stepped from the day
coach into the sleeper operated by defendant to ask permissioh to use the toilet accommodations therein); Fairbanks v. Boston Storage Warehouse Co., 189 Mass. 419, 75
N. B. 737, xo9 Am. St. Rep. 646 (where an elevator operator employed by defendant
struck the plaintiff, without provocation, while the plaintiff was in defendant's warehouse
looking after his goods that were stored there); Brown v. Boston Ice Co., 178 Mass. 1oS,
59 N. ]5.644, 86 Am. St. Rep. 469 (where the driver of defendant's 'ice wagon left the
company's ax on the sidewalk while he delivered ice to a house; upon returning he found
that plaintiff, a boy, had broken it, and the driver struck him to punish him for the act);
Johanson y. Pioneer Fuel Co., 72 MiUn. 405, 7S N. W. 719 (where an employee in charge
of a coal yard accused the plaintiff of attempting to get more coal than he was entitled
to, and upon plaintiff denying it, became enraged and beat plaintiff); Campbell v. Northem Pacific Ry. Co., 5i Minn. 488, 53 N. W. 768 (where a surgeon employed by defendant
railroad assaulted and injured the plaintiff, an assistant, while both were in a hospital
performing their respective duties); Walker v. Hannibal, etc., Ry. Co., 1z Mo. 575, a6
S. W. 360. 42 Am. St. Rep. 547, 24 L. R. A. 363 (where a baggageman threw drills out
of his car which struck plaintiff, which drills the baggageman was carrying gratuitously
and without authority from the defendant); Collette v. Rebori, 107 Mo. App. 7xX, 8a
S. W. $52 (where a debtor called to see about a bill he claimed to have paid, and a
servant of the defendant who was authorized to collect, assaulted him in an altercation
that followed); Feneran v. Singer Mfg. Co., .o App. Div. 574, 47 N. Y. Supp. 284
(where an agent of defendant, authorized to collect installments but itirected not to
re-take property, injuTed plaintiff in an attempt to re-take property); Meehan v. Morewood, s2 Hun (N. Y.) 566, S N. Y. Supp. 710 (where the foreman of the defendant's teahouse assaulted the plaintiff, a truckman who was getting a load of tea, because the plaintiff refused to take a chest he thought was in bad order); Kennedy v. White, 91 App.
Div. 47S, 86 N. Y. Supp. 852 (a janitor employed by defendant occasionally drove away
unruly boys from about the premises; on one such occasion the boys who were disturbing
him ran away at his approach, and looking across the street he saw plaintiff, who was
not and had not -been misconducting himself, and threw a stick 'at him which struck and
injured him); Wagner v. Haak, 170 Pa. St. 495, 32 Atl. 1o87 twhere defendant told his
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violence is resorted to for the purpose of coercing the performance
of that in which the servant was primarily interested rather than the
master.8 8 It is true that expressions indicating a wider liability are
sometimes to be found. Thus in a case in Wisconsin 7 where the
servant who was a barkeeper had made an assault upon one of his
*master's patrons, for the-purpose, as it was contended, of coercing
payment for liquors which he had purchased, the court said: "If
B (the servant) committed the assault for the purpose of collecting
payment 6f .his master's liquor, he was within the scope of his employment. It was his method of performing the duty delegated to
him, and, although the method may'not have been either authorized
or even contemplated,-nay, although it may have been expressly
prohibited,---yet the master is liable for the damages caused thereby,
provided he has entrusted to the servant the duty he was attempting
to, perform." Unless there is something peculiar about the particular business here involved, or unless the court deemed the case to fall
within the principle of those in which a special duty of protection
lessees of a quarry to tear down a fence erected by plaintiff, and "he would stand by
them'" and the lessees struck and beat plaintiff when he resisted); Benton v. Hill Mffg.
Co., .6 R. 1. x9, s8 AtL 664 (where an operator of defendant threw a sharp piece of
iron and struck the plaintiff, a child, who was annoying such operator by watching him
work); Waaler v. Great Northern Ry. Co., i8 S. D. 420, zoo N. W. 1o97, 70 L. R. A.
731 (where the employees of defendant were directed to erect a snow fence on land
belonging to plaintiff's employer, and the plaintiff was directed by his employer to remonstrate, whereupon hq was set upon and beaten 4y defendant's employees); Ware v.
Barataria etc. Canal Co., x5 La. r6p, 35 Am. Dec. 189 (where a lock-keeper on a' canal
assaulted the plaintiff under the pretext that the latter had not paid the toll); Kaiser v.
Mlean, 2o App. Div. (N. Y.) 326, 46 ,N Y. Supp. 1038 (, servant employed to light
lamps and guard them on an elevated railroad structure, threw stones at plaintiff, which
eaead plaintiff to run in front of azi approaching train; the court held the servant had
o 4n thority to assault anyone.
'81n McDermott v. American Brewing Co., xoS La. 124, 29 South 498, 83 Am. St.
Rep. --a, S2 L. R. A. 684, the defendant rompany had drivers in its employ who worked
on this basis: the driver was to deliver beer to customers and c6llect upon delivery; and
if the driver failed to collect, the company held him, personally, liable for the amount.
A driver had delivered beer one day to a saloon but failed to collect, whereupon the
company charged hiin for the amount. The next day the driver returned to the saloon,
where plaintiff was in charge. The driver demanded the price of the beer or its return.
Upon the plaintiff's refusal to do either, the driver committed an assault upon him. The
court held that the defendant company was not liable for the assault.
In Steinman v. Baltimore Antiseptic Laundry. Co., zop Md. 62, 71 At]. 5z7, the same
result was reached in a case involving similar facts.
87Bergman v. Hendrickson, io6 Wis. 434l, 82 N. W. 304 8o Am. St. Rep. 47.,
Compare McDermott v. American 'Brewing Co., iof "La. 124, 29 So. 498, 83 Am. St.
Rep. 225a, S- L. R. A, 684, supra. See also- McClung v. Dearborne, 134 Pa. 396,
x9 Atl. 698, 19 Am. St. Rep. 7o8,.8 L. R. A. 204; O'Connell v. Samuel, 8r Hun. (N. Y.)
357, So N. Y. Supp. 889; Peddle v. Gaily, sop App. Div. x78, 95 N. Y. Supp. 652; eerguson v. Roblin, 17 Ont. 167.
Language very similar to that of the Wisconsin court is found in the, opinion of'
Vann., 3., in Nowack v. Metropolitan St. Ry. Co., x66 N. Y. 433, 6o N. E. 32, 82 Am.
St. Rep. 6.z. With deference, the implications of his langdage are too wide.
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is supposed to exist (which seems probable from the cases cited), it
must be thought that the rule here laid-down is wider than sound
principle or the authorities generally will justify. It surely cannot
be true that because the master has entrusted to a servant the performance of a duty, the master can be held responsible for whatever
method the servant may adopt in attempting to perform it.
§ 44.
.
SHOOTING.-The question whether a master can
be held responsible for the shooting of a person by a servant whom
the master has placed in -charge of property, is a question which
must depend upon a great variety of circumstances. The master
may undoubtedly authorize the use of force under such circumstances as to be liable even for so extreme an application of it."
u In Letts v. Hoboken Ry. etc. Co., 7o N. J. L. 358, 57 AtI. 392, the plaintiff's
petition alleged that defendant's watchman, while executing his authority by removing
the plaintiff from the defendant's premises, shot and injured the plaintiff. The court
held the petitjon good on demurrer, saying: "Authority, given by the master to his
servant, to eject trespassers from the former's premises, charges the master with liability
for the act of the servant in.using excessive or inappropriate force in removing one who
was a trespasser."
In Fraser v. Freeman, S6 Barb. (N. Y.) 234, in which the defendant was in a dispute
with the plaintiff's intestate over the right to- use the basement of a building occupied
by defendant. The defendant took two servants, both armed to defendant's knowledge,
with the declared intention of "fighting it out" with plaintiff's intestate. The plaintiff's
intestate offering resistance, the servant of defendant killed him wantonly in the melee
that followed. The master was held liable for the servant's acts.
in Hachl v. Wabash Ry. Co., X19 Mo. 325, 24 S. W. 737, a watchman of defendant,
employed on a bridge with authority to keep trespassers off, shot and killed the plaintiff's
intestate, while he was trespassing on the bridge, although the evidence fails to show any
personal ill will held by the servant against the trespasser. The court held the defendant
liable.
In Magar v. Hammond, x83 N. Y. 387, 76 N. E. 474, 3 I. R. A. (N. S.) 1038, the
defendant employed a watchman to gi-ard his game preserve. The watchman shot the
plaintiff, who was poaching thereon. The court held that to render the defendant liable
the shooting must have been done by the watchman vwhile acting in the scope of his
employment, and whether it was so done is a question for the jury to determine.
In Southern Ry. Co. v. James, zs8 Ga. 340, 45 S. X. 303, 63 L. R. A. 257, the railway
company hired a watchman to arrest tramps who were stealing rides. This watchman arrested plaintiff and was taking him to the jail when the plaintiff sought to escape by
running away. The watchman shot him to stop him. The company was held liable.
In Savannah Electric Co. v. Wheeler, £28 Ga. 55o, S8 S. E. 38, So L.. R. A. (N. S.)
X176, a drunken street car conductor refused to give a passenger change, and when
requested for it, drew his revolver. The conductor attempted to shoot the passenger,
but the passerger so deflected his aim as to cause the bullet to go wide, and it struck
and killed a passer-by on the street. The company was held to be responsible for such
acts of the conductor, and to be liati- for the death of the pedestrian.
See also Deck v. Baltimore, etc., R. Co., zoo Md. x68, 59 AtL 65o, xo8 Am. St.
Rep. 399.
In Conchin v. El Paso & S. W. R. Co., - Arlz. -,
tog Pat. 26o, the watchman,
with a revolver furnished by defendant, shot toward plaintiff, intending to frighten him
away only, and hit him. Plaintiff was a technical trespasser. ' The defendant was held
liable for the wanton act.
.In Jones v. Railroad, 25o N. C. 473, 64 S. E. 205, plaintiff
was climbing upon a
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Under familiar principles he may be liable where, having authorized
the servant to use some force, the servant has used excessive force.
The mere fact however that the servant is put in charge of property
will not justify him in shooting any one who interferes with it, amd
the master will certainly not be liable where the servant shoots simply to give vent to his own personal malice or resentment, and certainly not in any case in which the shooting had no connection with
89
or relation to the act which the servant was authorized to perform.
SLANDER AND LIBBI..-The principal or master,
§ 45. -.
whether individual, corporate or partnership, may also be held liable
in many cases for the publication or utterance-of a libel or slander by
his servant or agent. 'In the case of libel, where the publication is
in the ordinary course of business and involves, no other malice or ill
will than that inferred from the unjustifiable publication of the derogatory matter, the cases holding the principal liable are now so
freight car. The flagman told him to come on up, but plaintiff turned to run, when the
flagman shot him. The jury, in answer to a specific instruction, said the agent was not
acting within the scope of employment, yet gave verdict for plaintiff. Held, It was
error to enter judgment for plaintiffi
" In Lytle v. Crescent News & Hotel Co., 27 Tex. Civ. App. S30, 66 S. W. 240, the
plaintiff disputed with the waiter at defendant's restaurant over a matter of change. The
plaintiff called waiter an opprobrious name as he was leaving the restaurant. The waiter
pursued and shot him. The master was held not liable.
In Turley v. B. & M Ry. Co., 70 N. H. 348, 47 At. 26x, a servant of defendant, whose
duty it was to trim switch-lamps, shot plaintiff, a member of a gang which he was trying
to drive from the yards. It was no part of his duty to clear the yards of trespassers.
The defendant was held not liable.
In Grimes v. YounF, 5 App. Div. 239, 64 N. Y. Supp. 859, a night watchman was
furnished with a revolver by defendant, his master, and instructed to use it only in self
defense, or to fire in the air to scare trespassers. The watchman killed a boy wantonly,
who was not on defendant's property nor interfering in any way with it. The defendant
was held not liable.
In Sandies v. Levenson, 78 App. Div. 306, 79 N. Y. Supp. 9S9, a watchman seized
and held a boy who had gone into defendant's yards (guarded by the watchman) for a
ball. While so holding the boy the watchman, for some purpose, discharged his revolver
in the air, and the bullet accidentally struck plaintiff. The defendant was held not liable.
In Holler v. Ross, 68 N. J. L. 324, 53 AtL 472, 96 Am. St. Rep. 546, s9 L. R. . 943,
the defendant hired a watchman to guard his goods stored on a wharf belonging to another.
The watchman saw three men prowling about the wliarf and ordered them to halt. They
refused and he shot them. The gun used was not furnished by the defendant. The
defendant was held not liable.
In Golden v. Newbrand, 52 Iowa 59, 2 N. W. 537, 3S Am. Rep. 257, an armed watchman, employed by defendant to protect his property, shot and killed an intoxicated man,
who had just been engaged in a disturbance with another, but who was retreating from
the defendant's property when killed. The defendant was not liable.
In Belt Ry. Co. v. Barucki, io2 Ill. App. 642, a'watchman shot a trespasser; and the
court held the mere employment of a watchman to guard premises and keep away trespassers, did not involve an authority to shoot trespassers; a fortiori, where the trespisser
was actually leaving the premises, as in this case, when shot. The defendant was held
not liable.
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numerous as to require no discussion.90 The principal is liable in
such a case even though he was not personally present or aware of
the publication, but had confided the conduct of the business to an
agent.'
The principal may also be liable for publications in the
course of the business, even though actual malicious intention must
be proved,9 2 and he will be liable for a publication made in the course
of the business and for the purpose )f furthering the principal's interests even though it was the result of actual malice." On the other
hand, there could be no doubt that a servant or agent who merely
took. advantage of the opportunity afforded by.his position, to libel
others in order to gratify his own malice and ill-will, in matters in no
way within the course of his employment, would not impose a liability upon his principal. 9'
§ 46.
With reference to slander, the case presents some
differences of aspect. It is more easy to see, for example, that a
principal or master, whose business is that of publishing, may be
liable fo defamatory publications by his servant or agent, than
it is to see how liability for defamatory spoken words may arise in
See, for example, in the case of corporations:

Hypes v. So. Ry. Co., 82 S. C.
Co., 90 Miss. 196, 43 South.
471, 9 I. R. A. (N. S.) 93z (slander); Sawyer v. Norfolk & Son. R. R., 244 N. C. x,
54 S, F. 793, xi3 Am. St. R. 7x6 (slander); Peterson v. Western U. Tel. Co., 6S Minn.
x8, 67 N. W. 646 (libel); Philadelphia, etc., R. Co. v. Quigley, 62 U. S. (21 How.) sos
(libel); Washington Gas ,Light Co. v. Lansdtn, 172 U. S. S36 (libel); Hussey v.
Norfolk & Son. R. R. CO., 98 N. C. 34, 3 S. . 923 (libel); Hardoncourt v. North
Penu. Iron Co., 2a5 Pa. 379, 74 At. 243 (libel); Fogg v. Boston & Lowell R. R. Co.,
148 Mass. 53, 20 N. F. 109 (libel); Howland v. Blake Mfg. Co., %S6 Mass. 343, 31
N. 5. 656 (libel); Rose v. Imperial Eugine Co., X27 App. Div. (N. Y.) 88S, zsz N. Y.
S. 8, 19S N. Y. 323, 88 N B. 2230 (libel); Fraternal Alliance v. Mallalieu, 87 Md. 97,
39 Adt. 93 (libel); Minter v. The Bradstreet Co., 174 Mo. 444, 73 S. W. 668 (libel).
For cases involving liability of partners Tor libel, see: Woodling v. Knickerbocker,
Vr Minn. 268, 27 N. W. 387; Atlantic Glass Co. v. Paulk, 83 AIR. 404, 3 South. 8o;
Wheless v. Davis, (Tem. Civ. App.), 122 S. W. 929; Haney Mfg. Co. v. Perkdns, 78
Mich. 1. 43 N. W. 1o73 (slander and libel); Lthrop v. Adams, 133 Mass. 47!, 43 AmL
32S, 64 S. X. 39S (slander]; Rivers v. Yazoo & Miqs. R. 1.

Rip.

S28.

That a partner is not liable for the slander of a co-partner, depending upon statnte:
Ozborn v. Woolworth, 2o6 Ga. 459, 32 S. F. 58z; Hendricks v. Middlebrooks Co., xxS
Ga. 13r, 236, 44 S. Z. 835.
For cases involving liability of individual principal or master for libel of agent cc
servant, see: Dunn v. Hearst, 139 Cal. 239, 73 Pac. 238; Taylor v. Hearst, 107 Cal.
262, 40 Pac. 392; Williams v. Fuller, 68 Neb. 3S4, 94 N. W. 228, 68 Neb. 362, 97
N. W. 246.
luSee Storey v. Wallace;, 60 IIl. sr; Dunn v. Hall, r Ind. 344; Andres v. Wells,
7 Johns. (N. Y.) 26o, S Am. Dec. 267; Perret v. New Orleans Times, 2S La Ann. 170.
5
Lothrop v. Adams, 133 Mass. 47t, 43 Am. Rep. S28 (a ease involving liability
of one partner for act of another); Bruce v. Reed, 204 Pa. 408.
nPennsylvania Iron Works v. Voght Machine Co., (Ky.), 96 S. W. 5Sz, 29 Ky.
L. R.ep. 86r, 8 L R. A. (N. S.) 2023 (a case of libelous letter written by the agent of
a corporation in an endeavor to get business for his principal).
"See Washington Gas L. Co. v. Lansden, 172 U. S. 5s34, 9 Sup. Ct. 296, 43 I,.

S43.
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the conduct of a business in which publication is not an incid ent.
Nevertheless such cases may exist,-the difficulty ordinarily being
to find that the speaking was within the scope of the employment.
In the case of corporate principals- or,masters, several text writers
and some courts have held that there can be no liability for slander
by a servant or agent, it being said that "there can, be no agency to
slander." ' 5 But this reasoning is not conclusive, and several courts
have held that liability may -exist in these cases if the speaking of
the words was in the course of the employment,"" though it must be
said that, upon the latter point, there has been a tendency in some
courts to overlook the distinction between acts done in the 'course
.of -tlie employment and those done merely during the employment.
oFzOYD
R. MXcHnU.'
TUNvzmsnTY or CHicAGo:
T

Odgers on Libel and Slander (Ost Am. ed.) *368; Newell on Defamation (zst.
ed.) 36z Ebut see 2d ed. 3761 ; Townshend on Slander and Libel (2d cd.) § 265; Behre
v. Natiofial Cash Reg. Co., zoo Ga. 213, 27'S. E. 986, 62 Am. St. R. 320; Singer Mfg.
Co. v. Taylor, xSo Ala. 574, 43 So. 210, 9 L. R. A. (N. S.) 929 and Note, 124 Am.,
St. R. 9o;.Duquesne Distrib. Co. v. Greenbaum, 135 Ky. 182, 121 S. W. zo26, 24 L. R.
A. (N. S.), 955 (a partnership).
'" npire Cream Co. v. De LaVal Dairy -Co., 75 N. J. L. 2o7, 67 AtL 7z r; Sawyer
v. Norfolk, etc. R. Co., 14i X. C. 1, 54 S. ].' 793, xzS Am. St. R. 76 .and Note (defeadant held not liable in this case because act not in course of employment); Redditt
v. Singer Mfg. Co., 124 N. C. 100, 32 S. ]. 392 (same); International Text Book Co.
v. Heartt, 69 C. C. A. 127, r36 Fed. r29 (same); Rivers v. Yazoo, etc., R. Co., 90
Miss. 296, 43 So. 47!, 9 L. R. A. (N. S.) '93! (a case which was decided upon the
pleadings but which seems questionable upon the facts); Hypes v. Southern Ry. Co.,
8z S. Car. 3x5, 64 S. . 395.
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